

# How Tracking Companies Circumvented Ad Blockers Using WebSockets

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- Value for their investment?
  - Extensive tracking to serve targeted ads.
- User concern over tracking
  - This has led to the proliferation of ad blockers
- Ad networks fight back
  - E.g Using anti-ad blocking scripts

# Google & Safari

- Google evaded Safari's third-party cookie blocking policy (Jonathan Mayer)
- ... by submitting a form in an invisible iFrame
- Google was fined \$22.5M by FTC

# This Talk

How Ad Networks leveraged a bug in Chrome API to bypass Ad Blockers using WebSockets

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How Ad Networks leveraged a bug in Chrome API to bypass Ad Blockers using WebSockets

- What caused this?
- How this bug was leveraged by ad networks?

# Web Sockets

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HTTP/S

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HTTP/S




# Web Sockets

HTTP/S



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HTTP/S



Chatting App



# Web Sockets

HTTP/S



request



response



Chatting App

anything new?



# Web Sockets

HTTP/S



Web Socket

# Web Sockets

HTTP/S



Web Socket



- Both client and server can send/receive data
- This is a persistent connection

# Ad Blockers

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webRequest API



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


Rule List

Usually borrowed  
from EasyList


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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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Visit 15  
links / website


Collected chains for  
all inclusion  
resources

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This means we know  
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which other resource




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**Before  
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- ~2% websites use web sockets.
- 55-61 % sockets are initiated by A&A domains
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- # Initiators drops after Chrome 58 release.
- Small but persistent A&A receivers.

# Initiators and Receivers


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## Top A&A Initiators

A&A Initiator	#A&A Receivers
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google	11
doubleclick	9
youtube	8
addthis	8
hotjar	6
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
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- **33across & Lockerdome** are advertising platforms.

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
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
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- **Inspectlet & Hotjar** are session replay services.

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


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
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97% is **33across**


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
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- ~1.5% WebSockets sends the entire DOM to **Hotjar**

# Received Items Over Web Sockets


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
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Ads served from **LockerDome**

# Summary

- ~67% of socket connections are initiated or received by A&A domains.
- Major companies like Google, Facebook, Addthis adopted WebSockets.  
Abandoned after Chrome 58 was released.
- The culprits:
  - **33across** was harvesting fingerprinting data.
  - **HotJar** was exfiltrating the entire DOM
  - **LockerDome** downloaded URLs to serve ads.
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Questions?  
ahmad@ccs.neu.edu

# Discussion Points

- What's Next?
  - Can these findings be used to fine advertisers or shape new policies?
- Major Ad Exchanges abandoned WebSockets — Why?
- New web standards.
  - Can be problematic? Where should we intervene?
- Surprising that it took few years to patch this bug
- WebRTC aspect of it.

Backup Slides

# Inclusion Chain

## DOM Tree

```
<html>
  <body>
    <script src="tracker/script.js" </script>
     </img>

    <script src="ads/script.js" > </script>
    <iframe src="frame.html">
      <html> <body>
        <script src="script_12.js" > </script>
         </img>
      </body> </html>
    </iframe>
  </body>
</html>
```

Source code for ads/script\_12.js

```
let ws =
  new WebSocket("ws://adnet/data.ws", ...);
ws.onopen = function (e) {ws.send("...");}
```

## Inclusion Tree

